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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
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                                              C.A. NO. 00-105L
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       ESTATE OF YARON UNGAR, et al
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                                              JULY 30, 2003
           VS.
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                                              11:00 A.M.
      THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION
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       ORGANIZATION, et al
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                                              PROVIDENCE, RI
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              BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD R. LAGUEUX,
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                        SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
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                  (Objections to Magistrate's Orders)
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       APPEARANCES:
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       FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
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          AUG 12 2003
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       DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
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30 JULY 2003 -- 11:00 A.M.
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THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. The matter before the Court is Civil Action 2000-105L, the Estate of Yaron Ungar and others versus The Palestinian Authority and others. The matter is here on four appeals or objections to orders entered by the magistrate judge.

The first one is an objection to an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to strike all of these objections and appeals by the PA Defendants. The second one is the PA Defendants' objection to a memorandum and order granting Plaintiffs' motion to enter default. The third one is the PA Defendants' notice of appeal from an order continuing hearing on motions for default judgment. And finally, the PA Defendants have filed a notice of appeal of a denial of Defendants' motion for a protective order against depositions.

I will hear those four matters. And rather than take them separately, I'll hear arguments on them as a whole. Will the attorneys identify themselves for the record, please.

MR. STRACHMAN: David Strachman for the Plaintiffs.

MR. SCHILLING: Lawrence Schilling for the

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Defendants, your Honor.
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MR. SHERMAN: Deming Sherman for the Defendants.

THE COURT: All right. I'll hear from the PA
Defendants on each one of these appeals or objections.

MR. SCHILLING: Thank you, your Honor. If it please the Court, we think it makes sense to consider all of these objections as a whole because they have common issues.

THE COURT: That's right. I want to save time.

I want to save time instead of rehashing on each one.

So you can make your full arguments on each one of these orders.

MR. SCHILLING: The essential source of problem is the --

THE COURT: Please speak into the microphone.

MR. SCHILLING: -- is the importance to the Defendants of their claim of sovereignty and the doctrine that they should not be required to bear the burdens of litigation, specifically in this case required to answer or required to make discovery, until there's a final determination of their right to immunity and related issues. This is not new.

And the second factor, and it's a matter of great concern, is the disruption, the possible disruption of the peace process and the roadmap

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negotiations that are ongoing that might occur if there was -- if the action moved forward.

And the third factor is the difficulty that the Defendants face in making discovery and appearing for depositions. It's difficult, if not impossible. The Plaintiffs go on and on about the urging litigation over the difficulty of the conditions. We think that this is perhaps a -- it's important, but it's a secondary issue because the basic concern here that the Palestinian government has is in protecting itself and preserving the rights of its people, millions of people, and in moving forward in a constructive way with the peace process.

The orders come up in the context, I think your Honor's familiar with them, but I'll just mention them briefly. There was a hearing before your Honor on April 11th, and at that hearing your Honor indicated that the Defendants' motion for reconsideration of the order to -- the denial of the motion to dismiss would be forth -- would be denied.

An order issued on April 22nd, and we appealed on that day, took an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit. So that the first of the orders that's at issue here was issued prior to the appeal, and the -- the first two were on April 18th. The appeal was on

April 22nd.

The May 14th order was issued while the appeal was pending, and indeed we applied to the magistrate at a hearing on May 14th that the hearing be continued until after the appeal. The magistrate denied that motion, and he issued one order, the May 14th order, on the same day; and he issued the May 27th order which was discussed at the May 14th hearing on the 27th.

And also on May 27th the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment. It's a short judgment. The Court of Appeals was aware that the May 14th order had been entered. We filed a designation, the rules of appellate procedure when a motion for a stay is pending, and we moved for a stay on the same day that we filed an appeal, parties can designate for filing in the Court of Appeals the -- any documents in the District Court.

So we had the May 14th order called to the attention of the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals rendered a decision that's susceptible of several interpretations; but pursuant to the Court of Appeal's judgment, we read it to suggest that a properly supported Rule 12(b)(1) motion could be filed. The judgment says, "They have not yet answered the Complaint, and we do not discount the fact that they

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may still be able to file a properly supported Rule 12(b)(1) motion below. This seems especially likely given the jurisdictional implications of the issue and the Appellee's characterization of the Court's immunity ruling as interlocutory."

And they also went on to say, "This order is without prejudice to the Appellants raising their sovereign immunity defense in a proper and timely We take no view as to the merits of that defense."

At the time they wrote this, the Court of Appeals was aware, or at least had before it, the fact that the magistrate had entered a default with respect to the lack of an answer.

I mention these things, your Honor, because they -- we filed a properly supported motion on June 13th. I think Mr. Strachman's objection, I'm assuming he will object, is due tomorrow; and we consider the motion to be extremely important, and it provides a further basis for our urging, as we have been urging all along, that the grounds with which I began and the importance to the Palestinian government and people of their immunity defenses and the -- and their right to be free of the burdens of litigation until there's a final determination of the issue.

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I think that's pretty much what I have to say, your Honor. The arguments that the Plaintiffs go on about are, I think, not central to this basic ground of our concern. With respect to the May 14th order, I think that the Plaintiffs make a number of misstatements or exaggerations about the -- what the papers have to say about the relationship between the Palestinian government and Hamas.

At the time that the papers were being written, there was a front page discussion of the negotiations that were going on between the Palestinian government, and that would be Prime Minister Abbas, and Hamas about the cease-fire. And it was crucial to the roadmap going forward that there be some progress made in this area, and that's what we referred to specifically in our papers.

And we said that the -- this case and the discovery being sought has at its heart a subject that is crucial to the acceptance and initial implementation of the roadmap, the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. And we were referring here to these ongoing negotiations, which were front page news and which are extremely important.

The Plaintiffs, I think, have mistakenly characterized this as what they say is the relations

between the Palestinian government and Hamas are at the heart of this case, as the Defendants themselves candidly admit. I think that's -- that overstates the matter and that we were simply referring to the cease-fire negotiations that were going on.

The Plaintiffs also make an argument that because there was a lack of objection to the magistrate's earlier order on discovery, I think it was in January, that there's some sort of a waiver of the points that are being raised. I think there's nothing to that.

They cite a case which, in fact, points out that the preclusion of the argument occurred in a situation -- this is the *Sunview* case, your Honor, which Plaintiffs cite in their response to our May 14th submission. And the Court said that *Sunview* never sought to have the District Court review the magistrate's ruling, and so it couldn't be reviewed on appeal.

I think the matter of discovery, which is the subject of these orders, is fully before the Court and has been raised and that there's no merit at all to the Plaintiffs' argument that there's been a waiver which is irreversible. That's it, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Strachman?

MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you, your Honor. The Plaintiffs -- excuse me, the Defendants would have us now stop this litigation 40 months after it began, after two motions to dismiss were denied, after the First Circuit said this case was going forward, after your Honor has repeatedly said it's going forward, after discovery orders that said it granted them time after time to comply, and all because now, last month, they filed a new third motion to dismiss the case on issues that Mr. Clark himself identified as being crucial issues but he never fully briefed in his four previous attempts to dismiss the case.

And I say four because there was the initial motion to dismiss. When we argued before your Honor in September of 2000, your Honor suggested that the Defendants submit an additional brief on the issue of jurisdiction. They did so, and we filed an Amended Complaint. They moved to dismiss that. That was their third attempt. And then they filed a motion for reconsideration.

In each of those four motions, they had an opportunity to raise issues which they now say are crucial and which should bring this 40 months of litigation to a crucial halt. The problem is, when Mr. Clark himself filed the motion for pro hac vice for

admission into this Court, he identified these very issues. He said this was a crucial issue, whether the PA -- whether the PLO is a state. They chose not to raise these issues four previous times. Now they have litigation stopped because of their own methods and strategies of litigation.

The First Circuit said that was improper. The First Circuit said they have to comply with the rules like all other litigants. In the meantime, there are several things that have happened. First, Judge, in terms of the motion to strike, your Honor granted a similar motion to strike admonishing the Defendants not to provide scurrilous materials in the pleadings and personal attacks on people who aren't even attorneys in this case. In fact, in one instance the attack was on the husband of a woman who was a lawyer who's not involved in this case.

The Court admonished the Defendants not to continue that conduct. Judge Martin admonished them similarly in his order, and that type of attack has no place in this litigation. It's entirely inappropriate, and I would ask your Honor to adopt the same type of ruling that you did when you heard this matter, I believe it was, on April 11.

In terms of the motion to enter default, as the

Defendants were aware, and it was explicitly pointed out to them, when this Court rendered a decision on the motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint on November 4, the rules say they have 10 days to file an answer. We waited, I believe, 150 days to file a motion to default.

After now six months, they still have not filed an answer. They refuse to file an answer. And the kicker, Judge, is that when we were before Judge Martin, Mr. Clark said very honestly and I think very frankly, he informed the Court on page 6 of the transcript of April 1, he said very clearly, I met with Mr. Arafat. I traveled to Ramallah in December after your Honor's ruling. I went primarily for the purpose of discussing this case and some parallel cases, but primarily this case. And he says, quote, "My instructions have been, 'Do not answer.'" That's what he heard on December 15 or December 16 in his meetings with Mr. Arafat and the senior leadership of the PLO.

He also said in his response to our motion to default, quote, "Drafting and filing an answer is within Defendants' limited capabilities, though inadvisable." So basically they're saying this litigation is going to come to a halt because people who live in another country, who are not here before

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the Court, his own clients, don't want to comply with the rules and don't want to comply with the Court orders and the requirements of litigation in this case.

They cite a letter from a Mr. al-Kidra, who apparently is some sort of employee of the PLO or PA in New York. It's unsigned. It's unsworn. Judge Martin said it's inadmissible; and even though he reviewed it, he said it provides no basis for not filing an answer.

By the way, your Honor, now several months later we still don't have an answer. So 40 months into this case, seven or eight months after you ruled on November 4, they still refused to file an answer.

In terms of the May 14, '03, order which they have appealed, Judge, it's somewhat shocking that they would appeal such an order because in that order we asked Judge Martin to enter default that day. And Judge Martin, as a matter of providing every possible courtesy to the Defendants, gave them an additional two months to comply with discovery obligations. And he said you can have until July 14, and I believe it was July 12 or July 13 we received a letter from opposing counsel saying they're not going to comply.

So I don't know how you can file -- how you can appeal an order giving even more time to do what you were supposed to do back in December.

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And in terms of the May 27 motion for protective order, in December we argued a motion to compel. On January 14, an order entered. That order, by the way, your Honor, took a month to enter because Mr. Schilling and I had several drafts back and forth to make sure it complied exactly with what Judge Martin wanted. And except for one tiny difference, we submitted virtually identical orders.

That order told them they have to comply with discovery. They have to present witnesses on 30 days' notice. It also, most importantly, said if they can't present the witnesses, if they can't comply with the discovery, the interrogatories, the Request for Production of Documents and the Request for Admissions, they could object and they could file proper objections item by item and say why they wanted to object.

Instead of doing that, several months later they file a request for protective order effectively trying to undermine what Judge Martin already did. They can't do that, and the law of the case is that they must comply. Under Rule 72, they've got to take an appeal within 10 days of the entry of the January 14 order. They never did that. They never appealed.

So they attempt to make a back-door attempt to undo that order. And what's most egregious is, instead

In repeated hearings before this Court and before Judge Martin, Mr. Clark has said he's been instructed not to respond to discovery, and he told Judge Martin that again two weeks ago at the hearing that we had.

Under Rule 26, they have a duty to confer with us, to ask us to engage in a discussion as to how they're going to comply, whether they can comply, whether there can be alternatives to the location or method of depositions, et cetera. Absolutely refused. I went out of my way three weeks in advance of the March 31 commencement date of the depositions to write a letter to my brothers and say, Are they coming? You know, can we discuss this? Is there a way to handle this? Because the pleadings that were being filed repeatedly said, We're not complying.

So I wrote again saying, What can we do to facilitate that? Absolutely no response, and then the absolute kicker. On the very first day that the

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So what we have is very selective participation in litigation, and we have a blatant disregard for the repeated orders of this Court and repeated suggestions by your Honor and by Judge Martin that this case is not a political case. It's not run by political parties on behalf of the Plaintiff. It's run by human beings who were killed and whose families were killed and simply want to move forward after 40 months.

I have provided to the Court, I think several times, in the Bucheit case a deposition of Mr. Ghassan Ramadan who testified. I also provided to the Court another deposition transcript or a transcript of a hearing that occurred in Jerusalem at the very same time, March of 2000, when the PA is producing all kinds

of witnesses to court in Jerusalem.

So to say they can't do this is very selective. They refused to comply with this Court's orders. In other countries, in other jurisdictions, they're perfectly willing to comply. And I think finally after 40 months this -- these pleas have to fall on deaf ears because they're basically saying we're coming to the end of the litigation, we're not going to participate.

So in light of that, Judge, last week we made two requests of the Court. We asked the Court to consider their motion, their third -- the motion for entry of default judgment, which they have not responded to. We've asked the Court to rule on that and determine that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(2) of the local rules that it's deemed granted because they failed to respond.

Your Honor gave them two additional periods of time to file answers. Then they file a motion saying we don't want to respond, we want to wait indefinitely to respond. And in that time your Honor referred that matter to Judge Martin, who scheduled a hearing on August 15th. They still haven't responded, even though it's on the calendar for August 15.

Additionally, your Honor, in terms of the Report and Recommendation that Judge Martin gave on July 3

concerning the entry of default judgment against Hamas, the 10-day appeal period or objection period ended last Monday. And on Tuesday we filed with the Court a request for entry of final judgment as well as proposed final judgment, and the Court's --

THE COURT: I'm going to deal with that at the end. That requires a motion on your part, and I'll deal with that.

MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me deal with these matters seriatim. The first objection was to an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to strike certain material contained in memoranda. This order was entered by Judge Martin on April 18th, 2003. Prior to that, I had granted the same motion to strike the material in a memorandum that was filed before me. This is a personal attack on counsel in Israel which I pointed out has no relevance to this case.

Judge Martin granted the motion to strike in the memorandum filed before him. It is entirely appropriate to strike that scurrilous and scandalous material. That is totally irrelevant to this case. Therefore, I affirm Judge Martin's granting of the motion to strike on April 18, 2003.

The key motion here is a motion or really an

appeal from an order by Magistrate Judge Martin granting Plaintiffs' motion to enter default against the PA Defendants. The PA Defendants are in serious default in responding to this case.

After motions to dismiss were denied, the
Defendants had an obligation to answer this case. It
is an absolute requirement of the Rules of Civil
Procedure that they answer this case. They have
refused to do it. In fact, by admission of Mr. Clark,
they have been ordered by the Defendants not to answer
this case.

I pointed out some months ago that in order for the Defendants to raise the defense of sovereign immunity, they had to file an answer setting out the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity and then move to have an early hearing on that matter. They failed to file the answer. Therefore, they are in default. They've default in this case.

The only issue that now remains for the Court to decide in this case is the amount of damages that should be assessed against these Defendants. Pure and simple, that's where this case is, right here and now. Therefore, the magistrate judge's order for the clerk to enter default against these Defendants is affirmed.

The next matter is a notice of appeal of Judge

Martin's order continuing hearing on motions for default judgment. Judge Martin gave these Defendants additional time to comply with discovery, but that is academic at this point. All discovery is academic in this case because the Defendants are defaulted. And the only thing that remains to be done, to reiterate, is the entry of judgment against these Defendants after a determination of the amount of damages sustained by these Plaintiffs.

Therefore, the order continuing the hearing on the motions for default judgment is affirmed, and I leave it up to Judge Martin to schedule a hearing on proof of claim for the entry of judgment against these Defendants and to make a determination of the amount of the judgments and to make a Report and Recommendation to me as to what the amount of judgment should be, as he had done in the Hamas part of this case. So to reiterate, this order continuing the hearing is affirmed.

It's for the benefit of the Defendants, but they haven't complied with discovery in any event. So now there are really two grounds for the entry of default, not only the failure to file an answer in this case but failure to provide discovery.

The final notice of appeal relates to the order

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To keep the record straight, I affirm the magistrate judge's denial of the motion for a protective order so as to advise him that I am in complete agreement with the way he's been handling this matter at the magistrate judge's level. So prepare an order, Mr. Strachman, on these four matters.

MR. STRACHMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, this only concerns Plaintiffs' counsel at the moment. The magistrate judge has issued a lengthy and very thorough Report and Recommendation on the liability of the Hamas. I've read it thoroughly, and I intend at some point to issue an order adopting that Report and Recommendation and publishing it; but before I can enter judgment, there are two things that I will require.

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First of all, it's necessary for the Plaintiffs to make a motion under Rule 54(b) for the entry of judgment at this stage because it does not resolve the whole case. The Court has to make a certification that there is no just reason for delay in entering a judgment against some of the parties and not all of the parties.

So I advise Plaintiffs' counsel to consult with the authorities on that subject and make an appropriate motion for the entry of judgment. And that motion will be made to me, and I will hear it.

There is one small flaw in the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. He recommended that I impose prejudgment interest, but he did not state what the source of that rule of law is in this case and what the amount of prejudgment interest should be. And so I want Plaintiffs' counsel to educate me on what the proper rate of prejudgment interest should be in cases of this kind, federal cases based on federal question as opposed to diversity cases.

The Court usually looks to some federal statute that establishes what prejudgment interest should be. In the absence of a federal statute, then the question arises whether the Court should look to the statute of the forum state or choose a rate of interest that is

reasonable under the circumstances.

For example, in admiralty cases, there is no statute that provides for prejudgment interest; and since admiralty is a federal matter, the Court is authorized to choose a rate of interest that is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. And that's what I have done in admiralty cases, and it may well be that that is the rule of law that applies to this case.

But I want to be educated on that subject. So before I take any further action on that Report and Recommendation, I will expect to receive a motion from Plaintiffs' counsel.

MR. STRACHMAN: Thank you, your Honor. Certainly.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further we should discuss? All right. Hearing none, then, the Court will take a recess.

(Adjourned)

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4	I, Karen M. Zinni, RPR-RMR-CRR, do hereby
5	certify that the foregoing pages are a true and
6	accurate transcription of my stenographic notes in the
7	above-entitled case.
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11	- Jan M. Jan
12	Karen M. Zinni, RPR-RMR-CRR
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